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Intuitions in Epistemology: Towards a
Naturalistic Alternative
Kristoffer Ahlstrom
Philosophy Department, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
e present paper revisits themainmethodological problemswith conceptual anal-
ysis and considers two attempts to rectify them in terms of prototypes and reective
equilibria, respectively. Finding both wanting for the purposes of epistemological
analysis, a naturalistic alternative is then sketched that explores the positive impli-
cations of aforementioned problems for the demarcation of the respective roles of
intuitions and empirical investigation within three epistemological domains, viz.,
the evaluation of epistemological hypotheses, the amelioration of epistemic prac-
tices, and the construction of a theory of epistemic value.
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1. e Dominant Approach
On the dominant methodological approach in philosophy, philosophical
analysis is identied with conceptual analysis and candidate analyses evalu-
ated by determining whether they are susceptible to intuitive counterexam-
ples. Presently, there is no need to suppose that all philosophy is conducted
on this model. Some endow intuitions with a great evidential weight (e.g.,
Kripke 1980); some take amoremoderate standpoint (e.g., Lewis 1973); some
defend the use of intuitions, but argue that probing them should be con-
strued not so much as an inquiry into concepts as an exploration of a priori
truths (Sosa 2007); and some claim that philosophical analysis should not
be concerned with intuitions at all (Kornblith 2002). For present purposes,
however, it suces to note that a heavy methodological reliance on catego-
rization intuitions constitutes the rule rather than the exception in contem-
porary analytic philosophy.e Gettier discussion constitutes a particularly
clear example of intuition-driven philosophy (Shope 1983, Gettier 1963), as
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does the literature on causal theories ofmeaning (Kripke 1980, Putnam 1975)
and discussions about personal identity (Part 1984,omson 1971). In fact,
this practice of supporting and refuting philosophical analyses in terms of
denitions with reference to categorization intuitions and the concepts that
they are taken to reveal is so widespread that it has been referred to as part
of “the standard justicatory procedure” in philosophy (Bealer 1998).
1.1 e Desiderata of Philosophy as Conceptual Analysis
On this procedure, philosophy inquires into concepts by dening themean-
ing of linguistic terms, most likely against the background of an assumption
to the eect that what a subject means is a function of the concepts that she
possesses; an assumption that, furthermore, nds support in the fact that an
impressive amount of the phenomena discovered in the empirical work on
conceptual and non-verbal classication also turn up in the corresponding
linguistic tasks (Murphy 2002).1 Moreover, the favored format for captur-
ing meanings is that of necessary and sucient application conditions. In
fact, philosophers typically are not asking for just any necessary and su-
cient conditions, but for conditions that have clear-cut boundaries, so as to
ensure that category membership is a straightforward yes-or-no aair (Lau-
rence andMargolis 2003). Let us refer to the desideratumof identifying such
clear-cut, necessary and sucient conditions as exactitude.
As already noted, common practice typically also requires that the def-
initions provided via such conditions do not admit of any genuine intuitive
counterexamples (i.e., counterexamples that cannot be explained away). Let
us refer to this desideratum as exhaustiveness. e assumption behind this
desideratum is that the possession of a concept involves a tacit (albeit po-
tentially incomplete) knowledge of its dening conditions, to be captured by
our philosophical theories (Ramsey 1998).2 Being tacit, the content of that
knowledge is not something that may be straightforwardly produced by any
competent user of the corresponding term. Still, in so far as categorization
1 is is not meant to suggest that there is a neat one-to-onemapping between concepts and
(meaningful) words—a claim that would be incompatible with ambiguous words, syn-
onyms, and concepts that do not have a word (in some cases, not even a string of words) to
go with them—but merely that there is a (non-unique) mapping from concepts to mean-
ings. It also is not to say that conceptual contents are determined by cognitively internal
factors, or that all aspects of what a word or sentence communicates in use is a function of
concepts possessed.
2 A similar assumption is driving the Chomskyan tradition in linguistics, where the intu-
itive judgments of speakers are taken as linguistic evidence—on some readings the only
available evidence—for particular sets of rules and principles of the speaker’s language.
See (Samuels et al. 1999) for a discussion of the analogy between the linguistic and the
conceptual analytic case.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom 17
intuitions are the products of the concepts possessed, a subject’s categoriza-
tion intuitions may serve as (fallible) guides to her concepts. Consequently,
probing the categorization intuitions of competent users of a termmay serve
to elucidate the dening condition that attaches to the corresponding con-
cept.3
As such, the elucidation of concepts plays a dual methodological role.
On the one hand, it provides positive material for the discovery of candidate
analyses, i.e., candidate necessary and sucient conditions that are clear-cut,
under the requirement of exactitude. On the other hand, it also serves a justi-
catory role in the evaluation of such analyses, not by necessarily contribut-
ing incorrigible or indubitable evidence, but by providing strong reasons for
disqualifying analyses in so far as they either include counter-intuitive in-
stances or fail to include intuitive instances, under the requirement of ex-
haustiveness. Hence, the method of contemporary conceptual analysis.
1.2 A Problem for Exactitude
Onewell-knownproblem for conceptual analysis understood thus is that the
classicatory structures unveiled by psychologists studying human catego-
rization display properties incompatible with the idea that concepts should
be represented in terms of clear-cut conditions (Murphy 2002).e catego-
rizations we, in fact, make reveal a taxonomy where members of a category
form a continuum, to the eect that some members are deemed to be “bet-
ter” or more typical instances than others, some less typical members are
considered to not be all that dierent from some non-members, and there,
hence, seldom will be any sharp boundaries between dierent categories.
Consequently, the conditions called for by exactitude simply do not seem to
be of the right kind if we are interested in capturing human concepts.
Why have philosophers concerned with conceptual analysis focused on
clear-cut denitions? One explanation might be a desire for clarity. Another
might be a desire to incorporate the properties dened through conceptual
analysis into axiomatic systems, perhaps in terms of set theory, the sets of
which have traditionally been dened in such a way that the borders that
delimit sets are completely clear-cut and no distinctions are made between
dierent members of the same set. Undoubtedly, understanding properties
in terms of such determinate sets has several advantages; for one thing, it
provides a nice framework for inferences between properties. However, as
we have seen, the classicatory structures that arise out of actual human
3 Commonpractice suggests additional desiderata, e.g., that the set of characteristics cited in
the analysis should be fairly small and their relation straightforward, so as tomake sure that
the resulting analysans is as simple as possible (Weatherson 2003, Ramsey 1998). However,
for present purposes, I will be focusing on exactitude and exhaustiveness.
18 Intuitions in Epistemology: Towards a Naturalistic Alternative
classication do not lend themselves to such characterizations and this has
direct implications for philosophicalmethodology. Or to put the pointmore
bluntly, as William Lycan has done recently in a retrospective piece on the
Gettier discussion:
It is well to remind ourselves that no eort of analytical philosophy to
provide strictly necessary and sucient conditions for a philosophi-
cally interesting concept has ever succeeded. And there should be a
lesson in that (Lycan 2006, 150).
But what is the lesson? Since simply rejecting exactitude does not amount
to abandoning the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis, it is too early
to be pessimistic about the dominant approach as such. For this reason, the
next section considers two possible rectications of traditional methodol-
ogy, highlighting yet another problem for conceptual analysis—i.e., does the
armchair provide the most suitable methodological location for the analysis
of concepts in light of themore rigorousmethods of empirical psychology?—
that, ultimately, leads us to the more fundamental question: Why (if at all)
should philosophers analyze concepts in the rst place?
2. Two Attempts at Rectication
It might be argued that the methodological implications of aforementioned
psychological research are perfectly straightforward: Any philosopher con-
cerned with the analysis of concepts has to take the empirical work on ac-
tual human categorizations seriously.is also highlights the sense in which
the problem for exactitude ammounts to an internal objection to conceptual
analysis, that does not discredit the project of analyzing concepts as such,
but merely throws doubt on a particular way of doing so. Consequently, the
problem might seem perfectly solvable; all we need to do is nd an empiri-
cally more warranted way to characterize concepts.
2.1 Prototypical Conceptual Analysis
One way to do this is to do conceptual analysis in terms of so-called proto-
types, i.e., lists of prototypical features which, according to some psycholo-
gists, providemore plausible representations of human concepts (Rosch and
Mervis 1975).4 Such an analysis—let us refer to it as Prototypical Conceptual
Analysis, or PCA for short—would proceed by way of an assumption to the
eect that, for any concept‘F,’ there is a prototype set, Q, and a threshold
value for categorization, T , such that the weighted sum of Q predicts posi-
4 Goldman and Pust (1998) suggest something along these in light of aforementioned prob-
lems with traditional conceptual analysis, as does Goldman (2007).
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tive categorization for the given concept when, and only when, it coincides
with or exceeds T .
Let us consider this assumption in light of the two aforementioned desi-
derata. Given that items may have more or less of the features in Q and the
features may be assigned dierent weights, items that have enough weighted
features to exceed T will form a continuum. Furthermore, given that T may
be construed either as an absolute value or as a value satised in so far as
it is approximated, the present model can also handle situations involving
vague concept boundaries. As such, PCA rejects exactitude, in allowing for
the possibility of the kind of intra-concept distinctions and non-clear-cut
boundaries identied by way of the scientic ndings reviewed above.
If we hold on to exhaustiveness, PCA latches on to the relevant weighted
features and yields predictions of categorization judgments that do not ad-
mit of any (genuine) counterexamples. As already the above characteriza-
tion makes clear, PCA would most likely yield utterly complicated analyses
if conducted thus. Still, if one looks at actual philosophical practice, PCA is
not terribly dierent from traditional conceptual analysis here. Unlike tra-
ditional conceptual analysis, however, PCAwould not generate complicated
analyses due to an inaccurate theory of concepts. Rather, PCA would yield
complicated analyses because concepts and categorizations are, as a matter
of empirical fact, governed by quite complicated mechanisms.
2.2 Analysis, the A Priori and Empirical Investigation
is observation also serves to highlight the fact that conceptual analysis
may be construed as an explicitly empirical task—i.e., as substantially relying
on sense experiential input—indeed, perhaps even a scientic task, which is
in stark contrast to how it has been conducted bymost analytic philosophers.
Considering the common view that conceptual analysis is (and should be) a
priori—i.e., that it pertains to pure thought or reason alone—it will serve us
well to elaborate on the distinction between empirical and armchair inquiry
in relation to the distinction between a priori and a posteriori (i.e., non-a
priori) warrant.
As pointed out by Alvin Goldman (2007), the two distinctions do not
seem to coincide. Granted, a priori warrant never involves an empirical
method and paradigm examples of an empiricalmethod do, indeed, proceed
by way of a posteriori sources of warrant (knowledge through perceptual ob-
servation being one of them). But since some warrant is neither a priori nor
owing in any straightforward way from sense experience, it hardly follows
that a posterioriwarrant never involves a non-empiricalmethod. Take intro-
spection and memory, for example, neither of which can be plausibly said
to give rise to a priori warrant. However, since they do not relate to our
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senses in any relevant way, they would still qualify as non-empirical sources
of warrant under the above characterizations.
is way of construing the distinctions, Goldman points out, enables us
to formulate two distinct approaches to categorization intuitions. On the
third-person approach, the classication judgments of a subject are treated
as data used in testing hypotheses about the content of the subjects’ con-
cepts. Since the evidence is distinctly empirical, the approach is an exam-
ple of conceptual analysis construed in empirical, a posteriori terms. Still, it
does not resemble conceptual analysis as it has traditionally been conducted,
which brings us to the rst-person approach, where one is primarily consult-
ing one’s own categorization intuitions. Construed thus, conceptual analy-
sis does not involve perceptual observation. But on the above denitions,
it does not, thereby, follow that the resulting warrant is a priori. As Gold-
man points out, “the process of generating classication intuitions has more
in common with memory retrieval than with purely intellectual thought or
ratiocination, the core of the a priori” in that the “generation of classica-
tion intuitions involves the accessing of a cognitive structure that somehow
encodes a representation of a category” (Goldman 2007, 20). As such, con-
ceptual analysis from a rst-person approach is best described as an instance
of non-empirical, a posteriori investigation.
What is the most promising approach to PCA, the rst-person or the
third-person approach? Here, we need to keep inmind that we, on PCA, not
only need to determine the prototypical features of the concept in question
but also the weight of each feature—not to mention any contextual factors
that might inuence the actual assignment of such weights. And make no
mistake:is is all as it should be, if we want fully exhaustive characteriza-
tions of our concepts. In other words, if we are to hold on to the ambition
of exhaustively characterizing concepts, it seems reasonable that conceptual
analysis should go beyond the armchair exercises characterizing contempo-
rary conceptual analysis in favor of hands-on, empirical investigations. For
one thing, themethods of empirical science are better suited for coping with
performance errors on part of the intuiting subject, i.e., situations in which
our intuitions are o the mark due to human limitations in attention span,
computational capacity, and the like. In addition, empirical science has su-
perior resources for not only collecting and handling large sets of data but
also for generating plausible generalizations about human concepts, when
compared to the experimental condition of the single, intuiting subject.
is, clearly, speaks for the third-person perspective on intuition prob-
ing. As such, however, it is not a call for giving up on intuitions. Indeed, any
inquiry into our concepts will rely, at least in part, on introspective reports
regarding conceptual content. However, above considerations do suggest
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that the armchair does not provide the most methodologically sound loca-
tion, if philosophical inquiry is to be conducted in accordance with exhaus-
tiveness, given the more rigorous methods of empirical psychology, which
typically do not only proceed by way of a more substantial body of data—as
in: data that goes beyond what is provided by the introspective reports of a
single philosopher and her colleagues—but also takes seriously themethods
as well as the methodological challenges that face psychological research in
general and introspective reports in particular.
2.3 Why Exhaustiveness?
At the same time, we need to remember that what we are interested in here
is conceptual analysis as it gures in philosophy. Exhaustiveness is not an
unreasonable desideratum within the branch of psychology concerned with
the empirical study of concepts, since nothing short of exhaustive accounts
would reveal those subtleties that we need to understand in order to get a
better grip on the exact structures of concepts and the ways in which they
develop. But let us turn to epistemology, not because that eld has any prior-
ity in philosophy at large, but because it is a eld where I think the relevant
methodological questions can be given informative answers. More speci-
cally, keeping in mind the possibility of a dierence in desiderata between
psychology and epistemology, why (if at all) should epistemologists be in-
terested in exhaustive accounts of our epistemic concepts?
First of all, it needs to be remembered that epistemologists are not inter-
ested in analyzing just any concepts.e ones of interest are the particularly
normative concepts such as KNOWLEDGE and JUSTIFICATION, that, un-
like non-normative concepts (like TABLE or DOG), are not only associated
with a set of semantic norms regarding properword use, but alsowith a set of
particularly epistemic norms or hypothetical imperatives according to which
you should be justied, in so far as you have certain epistemic goals. As such,
the present normative framework is explicitly instrumentalist, in that it takes
epistemic normativity to be a question of the extent to which something is
a means to a desired epistemic goal.5 In the following, I will refer to com-
binations of concepts, norms, and goals as epistemic architectures (without
passing any judgment on their instrumentalist merits), representing dier-
ent frameworks for epistemic inquiry.6
5 at a subject has certain epistemic goals does not imply that these goals may not be over-
ruled by non-epistemic considerations in natural settings. In other words, if it is an epis-
temic goal of a subject to (say) have true beliefs, that does not imply that she should have
true beliefs all things considered.
6 My notion of epistemic architectures bears some similarity to Goldman’s (1992) notion of
epistemic folkways. However, unlike Goldman, I will (a) not assume that there is enough
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Next, note that, if we take such epistemic architectures as objects of epis-
temological study, we may identify a candidate rationale for why we should
analyze epistemic concepts in exhaustive ways:
(S) Our epistemic concepts and norms are in full sync with our epis-
temic goals, in the sense that, by adhering to the norms in which
our epistemic concepts gure, we are presented with the optimal
way of reaching our epistemic goals.7
Does (S) hold?at is, can we assume that what we should do and what we
(barring performance errors) are prone to do coincide? As noted by Quine
(1969b) in an o-cited passage: “Creatures inveterately wrong in their in-
ductions have a pathetic but praiseworthy tendency to die before reproduc-
ing their kind” (Quine 1969b, 126). More specically, consider the following
(admittedly informal)modus tollens: Say that our epistemic concepts, norms
and goals are out of sync, in the specic sense that, by employing our epis-
temic concepts and norms, we tend to not reach our epistemic goals. Under
the common assumption that one central epistemic goal is true belief, it fol-
lows that we tend to not have true beliefs. Furthermore, since true (or at
least approximately true) belief is an integral part of attaining most practical
goals, including those involved in survival, it would follow that we tend to
not survive—which is demonstrably false.
However, this modus tollens, at most, lends support to the idea that
(S*) our epistemic concepts and norms are suciently in sync with our
epistemic goals to guarantee that, by adhering to the norms inwhich
our epistemic concepts gure, we tend to have sucient success in
reaching our epistemic goals to guarantee the attainment of most
practical goals.
But this, of course, is completely compatible with the idea that
(A) there might be an alternative set of concepts and norms such that,
if we were to employ those concepts and norms instead, we would
reach our epistemic goals to a greater extent than we are currently
doing.
conceptual homogeneity to warrant talk about our epistemic folkways (Weinberg et al.
2001), and (b) not only include concepts and norms but also epistemic goals, which, I take
it, is also a more proper place to assume at least some degree of homogeneity across dier-
ent architectures. However, see (Goldman 2001, 477), where Goldman seems to concede
the latter point.
7 Cf. (Weinberg et al. 2001) on “epistemic romanticism”.
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By way of illustration, say that an elucidation of our—or, at the very least,
a suciently prevalent—concept of justication yields the conclusion that
to be justied is to reason in accordance with one’s evidence in the specic
sense of scrutinizing the evidential connections that hold between one’s be-
liefs and their grounds and, ideally, only assenting to those propositions that
survive such scrutiny (Conee and Feldman 2004). Assume, furthermore,
that our ability to scrutinize the evidential relations between our beliefs and
their grounds is, in many situations, weakened by the dual fact that (a) we
seldom have introspective access to the grounds for our beliefs, and, (b) in
the cases where we do, we sometimes misconstrue them in ways that may
be ever so attering to our self-images but that oen make for quite unre-
liable reasoning tendencies (Wilson 2002). If so, there is an alternative way
to conceive of justication, if only in the minimal sense of a conception that
takes this empirical fact into account and, thereby, provides a more promis-
ing tool in the attainment of true belief (more on the question of axiology
below).
In light of the possibility of this kind of scenario, why pursue exhaustive
accounts of our concepts? Given the potential gap between our actual archi-
tectures, and the variety of architectures that might enable us to attain our
goals to an even greater extent than we are presently doing, it is no longer
obvious why the mere fact that an account violates our intuitive conceptions
should disqualify it as a potentially promising way to attain our epistemic
goals. Aer all, on the present instrumentalist framework, concepts and
the norms they gure in are only as good as they enable us to attain our
epistemic goals. Granted, epistemology needs to start somewhere and our
current epistemic concepts serve the crucial role of xing the subject mat-
ter. However, given the possibility of aforementioned gap, we no longer have
any reason to believe that we are better o with comprehensive rather than
with the kind of approximate accounts that may be provided by most com-
petent users of the corresponding terms.8 Focusing on competent users will
guarantee a prima facie relevance of the accounts in question, while still ac-
knowledging the fact that the real money will not be in knowing whether or
not the approximate accounts provided capture all the idiosyncrasies of our
epistemic concepts, but in determining whether the notions introduced can
be said to serve us well, given our goals as inquirers (cf. Kitcher 1992).
What are the implications for PCA?By throwing doubt upon exhaustive-
ness, the above line of reasoning suggests that PCA’s focus on experimental
8 e notion of a “competent user” that I have in mind here is not a particularly demanding
one. I simply mean to be referring to the kind of speakers that may communicate on the
matters at issuewith other speakers without any obvious problems about incomprehension
or communicative breakdowns.
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methods in elucidation is misdirected, at least as far as epistemology is con-
cerned.9 More than that, it also suggests that the stage at which we are going
to want to invoke experimental science is not so much at the point of xing
the subject matter, as in the context of an evaluation of the extent to which
the goals are actually attained by the methods and practices suggested by
the potential multitude of approximate accounts in question. As such, the
above raises two questions. First, given that there is no obvious rationale for
pursuing exhaustive rather than approximate accounts of our current con-
ceptions, what epistemological weight should be given to the investigation
of our current epistemic norms and concepts? Second, if traditional con-
ceptual analysis is not likely to do the trick as far as the evaluation of our
epistemic ways is concerned, what exactly is the role of more straightfor-
wardly empirical investigations in epistemology?
2.4 Analysis via Reective Equilibria
In attempting to answer these questions, let us consider an inuential met-
hodological suggestion that, unlike traditional and prototypical conceptual
analysis, relinquishes exhaustiveness in favor of the construction of philo-
sophical theories that put our categorization intuitions in a reective equilib-
rium—i.e., in a state of balanced co-existence—with any general principles
that we may accept. Although rst discussed by Nelson Goodman (1983) as
a way to account for the justication of inductive norms, it was John Rawls
(1971) who rst introduced the idea of reective equilibrium as a desired
end state of philosophical analysis. On the process Rawls imagined, the in-
tuitions associatedwith considered judgments about particular instances do,
indeed, carry some philosophical weight. However, just like a general prin-
ciple may be reconsidered in light of a conict with particular judgments to
which we are strongly attached, a conicting categorization judgment need
not in all cases indicate a aw in the theory, but in some cases rather be re-
jected, given that the principle responsible for the conict can be reasonably
deemedmore central, explanatory, or in any other waymore important than
that particular judgment. Hence, the rejection of exhaustiveness.
is provides at least the beginnings of an answer to the question of what
role our current concepts should play in epistemology, even if demoted from
a position where they have the rst and nal word:ey provide some rele-
vant data, but only in so far as they are deeply entrenched and do not conict
with any general principles deemed more important. However, when con-
sidering whether the method of reective equilibria might be successfully
9 Note that the same conclusion would follow on any other incorporation of a scientic
theory of concepts into conceptual analysis, such as the exemplar view. See (Murphy 2002)
for an excellent overview of the relevant experimental literature.
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applied in epistemology, we need to remember the point made in the previ-
ous section. at is, while bringing our categorization judgments and gen-
eral principles into greater coherence certainlymay be a good thing, the goal
of analysis is not merely to prune our conceptions for coherence; it is also
to make sure that the resulting analysans serves us well in the attainment
of our goals. is point is, by no means, lost on the defender of reective
equilibria.10 For example, Michael DePaul (1998) notes that the process of
seeking a reective equilibrium, properly construed, cannot be a question of
mere coherence, but rather “an even wider equilibrium” wherein the analyst
also must factor in any relevant theories that she accepts (cf. Daniels 1979).
Still, the extent to which incorporating theories thus may make a reective
equilibrium approach both applicable within epistemology and able to han-
dle the kind of suboptimal combinations of concepts, norms, and goals dis-
cussed above depends on whether the theories are responsive to the ends
that we are striving for. More specically, a pursuit of reective equilibria
in epistemology would not only need to take into account our current con-
cepts and norms, but also incorporate explicitly empirical theories, in or-
der to leave room for an evaluation of the extent to which the concepts and
norms utilized provide cognitive creatures like us with promising tools in
the attainment of our goals—all in accordance with what was argued in the
previous section.
at being said, the problem with a characterization along these lines is
not that it is on the wrong track but that so much more needs to be said (cf.
Williamson 2008). As it stands, the reective equilibrium approach seems
no more than a call for conscientious, philosophical inquiry, grounded in
our best empirical theories about the world. As such, it, clearly, has a place
in a sound, epistemological methodology. Still, the main methodological
challenge—as it has been demarcated above—does not lie in noting that
philosophers need to take into account not only our intuitions and gen-
eral principles but also our best theories about relevant empirical matters
in constructing their analyzes, but in providing a more detailed story about
the exact role that our categorization intuitions and norms should (or should
not) play in philosophical methodology, and how such intuitions and norms
should be weighed against empirical evidence, so as to yield an analysans
that serves us well. To this issue I now turn.
10 See, e.g., (Rawls 1974/1975, 8; Rawls 1971, 49), where Rawls himself shows some sensitivity
to this point.
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3. A Naturalistic Alternative
e present section explores the positive implications of the largely negative
points made above for the possibility of sketching a naturalistic alternative
to the dominant approach by demarcating the respective roles of catego-
rization intuitions andmore straightforward empirical investigations within
three epistemological areas: the evaluation of epistemological hypotheses,
the amelioration of epistemic practices, and the construction of a theory of
epistemic value.
3.1 Epistemological Evaluation and Amelioration
When stripped of its metaphysically saturated historical heritage, what are
categorization intuitions? e result of psychological mechanisms that, for
all we know, vary in systematic ways with cultural context (Weinberg et al.
2001) and oen are inuenced by (philosophically) irrelevant considerations
(Swain et al. 2008), but that, when properly utilized, nevertheless may pro-
vide us with interesting data about the concepts and norms that have been
handed down to us from our epistemic ancestors. As noted above, spelling
out those concepts and norms is a crucial step for epistemology in general
and amelioration in particular. More specically, intuitions about such con-
cepts and normsmay serve to x the subject matter of epistemology, by pro-
viding the basic material for the approximate accounts supplied by compe-
tent users of the corresponding terms.
As such, the role of intuitions would have to be considered fairly mod-
est. At the very least, the stage of conceptual elucidation does not amount to
as extensive an investigation as past epistemological excursions (if not im-
mersions) into the domains of conceptual analysis may lead one to believe.
is is to be expected since the use of intuitions, on the present suggestion,
is stripped of the justicatory powers it has been endowed with within the
dominant approach, and instead restricted to the context of epistemological
discovery. More specically, the point of the relevant elucidatory exercises,
I maintain, is not to evaluate or justify epistemological theories but to pro-
vide epistemological hypotheses, that (given the rejection of exhaustiveness)
are properly evaluated not so much with reference to whether or not they
clash or mesh with our intuitions, as by way of an empirical inquiry into the
question of whether the concepts and norms postulated serve us well, given
our epistemic goals.
is, of course, just serves to underscore the fact that epistemologymust
go beyond—indeed, far beyond—the data provided by intuitions. As we
have seen, this has, to some extent, been appreciated already by those de-
fending a reective equilibrium conception of epistemological methodol-
ogy, although that conception failed to provide a suciently informative ac-
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count of the exact relationship between conceptual questions and empirical
investigations. Beyond that, there is, of course, a long tradition in philos-
ophy of a fraternization (and, before that, an identication) with the sci-
ences, halted momentarily during the last century by a process of method-
ological purication inspired by Frege’s anti-psychologism (Kitcher 1992),
re-awakened through the works of W. V. O. Quine (1969a), and developed
further by more recent naturalistic epistemologists, perhaps most promi-
nently by Goldman (1999, 1992, 1986, 1978).11
In this tradition, two areas of empirical contribution to epistemological
theory play a particularly pivotal role. First, in order to properly evaluate
the merits of dierent epistemological hypotheses about our current archi-
tectures, we need to pay attention to empirical research on how creatures
like us actually go about forming belief. Relevant empirical research include
the variety of research programs in cognitive psychology (widely construed)
concerned with investigating the heuristics used in reasoning under uncer-
tainty (Gilovich et al. 2002) and understanding how the reliability of such
oen surprisingly simple heuristics can be understood in terms of consider-
ations about ecology and adaptivity (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). Second, and on
a related note, to the extent that such evaluations suggest that we rely on sub-
optimal belief-forming strategies, we need to attend to empirical research in
identifying ways in which they may be improved, typically with reference to
the implementation of reasoning strategies that either cater to our cognitive
strengths (Gigerenzer et al. 1999), or simply bypass some of ourmore serious
cognitive failings, e.g., by relying on predictive models rather than intuitive
judgments (Dawes et al. 2002).
3.2 Epistemological Axiology
Since these points have received thorough attention elsewhere, I will not
dwell on them further here.12 Instead, what needs to be stressed is that
both aforementioned tasks need to be conducted against the background
of a plausible theory of our epistemic goals, which brings us to the issue
of constructing a theory of epistemic value. What role can intuitions play
here? Here is a suggestion: By probing our intuitions about why we employ
the concepts and norms that we do, we may nd out something about what
it is that we are at all trying to attain within epistemic inquiry, in the sense
of what kinds of states, processes or properties are taken to be of epistemic
11 See (Kornblith 1994) for additional reference and a nice anthology of relevant literature in
and on the naturalistic tradition.
12 See earlier references to Goldman’s work. See also (Bishop and Trout 2005) for a more
recent elaboration on the naturalistic project.
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value.13 What will such an investigation reveal? Most likely, a concern with
getting things right, to use Andrew Latus’ (2000) phrase. at might not
seem very impressive a result. Still, it is a start and it seems to capture some-
thing central (albeit not necessarily exhaustive) about the epistemic point of
view: As epistemic inquirers, we strive to attain true belief and avoid false
belief. Let us refer to this as theminimal conception of epistemic value.
Since we are concerned with amelioration, the desideratum most rel-
evant in the eshing out of this conception is that the resulting theory be
sensitive to the epistemic priorities of actual inquirers—the targets of ame-
liorative advice and the closest we get in reality to epistemic inquirers.14 One
way for an axiological theory to fail this desideratum is by working with a
too abstract notion of epistemic value. In particular, any axiological account
in terms of inquirers aiming at truth or knowledge per se will be too far re-
moved from the concerns of actual inquirers to make for a fruitful basis of
ameliorative advice.is is not to deny that inquirers value truth (or knowl-
edge, etc.), butmerely to say that dierent inquirers value dierent truths (or
pieces of knowledge and justied belief), because they are trying to answer
dierent questions. As such, we would want our axiological theory to show
at least some sensitivity to what kinds of questions, results, explanations,
and so on, are actually deemed signicant within dierent areas of epistemic
practice (Bishop and Trout 2005, Kitcher 2001).
At this point, it might seem that the path of axiological investigation
would be straightforwardly empirical: All we need to do is nd out what
matters inquirers deem signicant. However, it should be noted that an-
other way to fail the above desideratum is by taking a proper axiology to
ow directly from such an empirical investigation. Such an axiology would
not fail by being out of touch with inquirers’ priorities, but by not being sen-
sitive to the distinction between the epistemic and the non-epistemic vectors
underlying those priorities. Aer all, the choices inquirers make regarding
how to invest their limited resources are a function of a variety of factors,
including those pertaining to availability of funds, popular support, and so
on. ese and similar factors that are of real and legitimate concerns for
scientic practice. However, they are arguably of no great epistemological
relevance, and should, as such, not gure prominently (if at all) in an epis-
temological axiology.
13 is point bears some resemblance to Edward Craig’s (1990) notion of a “practical explica-
tion”. However, unlike Craig, I do not take the relevant form of explication to be unveiling
concepts, as much as it reveals the goals with which they are associated. Since I have elab-
orated on this point elsewhere (Ahlstrom 2007), I will not dwell on it here.
14is is not to say that there might not be other desiderata for epistemological axiology
at large. See, for example, the variety of theoretical demands and desiderata discussed in
relation to the so-called value problem (Pritchard 2007).
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So, what factors should gure in an epistemological axiology? Here is a
suggestion: e truth and falsity of belief, as it pertains to matters deemed
signicant. For all its simplicity, this suggestion negotiates the above points
by (a) focusing on truth and falsity of belief, in order to exclude non-episte-
mic factors from epistemic evaluation, yet (b) restricting the scope to truths
and falsities pertaining tomatters deemed signicant, in order to avoid afore-
mentioneddisconnect between epistemological axiology and epistemic prac-
tice. at being said, the suggestion certainly does not amount to a full-
blown theory of epistemic evaluation. Rather, it is a general schema of eval-
uation that remains silent on two important points. First, what specic dis-
tributions of true and false belief are (more) epistemically desirable (than
others)? Candidate distributions include but are not exhausted by bodies of
belief with no false belief, bodies of belief with large numbers of true belief, bod-
ies of belief with favorable truth-falsity ratios, and large bodies of belief with
favorable truth-falsity ratios (as well as any combination thereof). Second,
what matters are, as a matter of fact, deemed signicant? Dierently put,
what kinds of truths (and falsities) are relevant to inquirers?
Since the topic of the present paper is methodology—not axiology—I
will not attempt to answer these questions here, but insteadmake amethod-
ological point about the respective roles that intuitions and empirical inves-
tigation may play in answering them. Consider, rst, the issue of candidate
distributions. What facts could be appealed to in choosing between dierent
candidates here? We have already considered a problem with simply look-
ing to the practices of inquiry here—practices conducted against the back-
ground of too rich a set of non-epistemic factors for any straightforward
investigations to reveal anything substantial about epistemic value. Alterna-
tively, we could turn to our intuitions, which also seems the most common
strategy in the literature.15 However, it is not immediately obvious that we do
have any particularly detailed intuitions about epistemic value beyond the
general framework provided by the minimal conception. Moreover, to the
extent that intuitions play a role in any renement of this framework, their
role could, most likely, be best explained not so much in terms of a sensi-
tivity to some axiological truth, as with reference to the fact that some of us
simply have gotten used to thinking about epistemic value in a particular
way, whereupon our intuitions follow suit.
is is not to say that what epistemological axiology we opt for is a mat-
ter of a completely arbitrary choice. For one thing, it would seem that any
account that is incompatible with the minimal conception is not an account
15 See (Grimm 2008), (Alston 2005), and (Latus 2000) for three recent and representative
examples of the nature of the discussion, and the way in which empirical (not to mention
scientic) considerations play a minimal role in the arguments considered.
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of epistemic value.16 But beyond the constraints imposed by that notion,
there does seem to be a constructive element to the development of a theory
of epistemic value, if not even one of stipulation. is is in contrast to the
second question above, about what matters are deemed signicant. Here, it
would seem that there not only is amatter of fact to identify, but that it could
be identied by straightforwardly empirical means. For example, we could
start by identifying certain paradigmatic instances of signicantmatters, and
then analyze these instances to see whether they share certain features and
can be grouped into more general kinds of issues.17 For present purposes,
it does not matter so much exactly what such an investigation would yield.
What is important is that its results would serve to anchor our epistemolog-
ical axiology in the concerns of actual inquirers, and ensure that the kind
of ameliorative advice considered above will be relevant to the concerns of
inquirers. Moreover, if combined with an account of epistemic evaluation
that is compatible with the general framework of the minimal conception,
such an axiology would be restricted to epistemic factors, and, thereby, also
preserve the specialized nature of epistemic evaluation, as concerned (at the
very least) with the generation of true belief and the avoidance of false belief.
4. Conclusion
e dominant approach to philosophy as conceptual analysis suers from
a series of methodological problems, at least within epistemology. As has
been suggested by many philosophers, one of the main problems pertains
to an inaccurate theory of concepts, but further investigation suggests that
the problem runs deeper than that, and ultimately motivates a close alliance
with the empirical sciences and an abandonment of the idea of philosoph-
ical analysis as exclusively or even primarily concerned with concepts. e
alternative methodological picture painted above—and I say “picture,” since
I do not pretend to have presented anything like a complete methodological
theory—was an attempt to not only account for the nature of that alliance,
but also elaborate in more detail on the interaction between relevant forms
of empirical investigations and aspects of philosophical inquiry that do (and
in some cases perhaps even have to) rely to some degree on the probing of
intuitions.
As such, the picture suggests a certain methodological continuity with
both nineteenth century analytical epistemology and historically prominent
as well as more recent naturalistic attempts to bridge the (perceived) gap
16 Notice that this claim is compatible with the proper account of epistemic value being one
that includes truth as one epistemic goal among many (Kvanvig 2005).
17 SeeKitcher’s (2001) signicance graphs forwhatwould,most likely, be a helpful conceptual
tool in such an investigation.
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between philosophy and the sciences. Needless to say, further renements
of this picture are both desirable and necessary. Still, it would seem that it
at least has the outlines of the kind of methodological approach that, al-
beit thoroughly naturalistic, not only illustrates the respect in which any
complete epistemology may legitimately invoke both empirical and non-
empirical modes of inquiry and, thereby, make good of the original Quinean
promise of a naturalized epistemology as one involving a reciprocal con-
tainment between epistemology and the natural sciences (Quine 1969a), but
also identies a kind of epistemological methodology that is empirically in-
formed and benecial to the practices of inquiry without, thereby, being di-
alectically alienating for non-naturalistic philosophers.
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